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Fault trees and Petri nets are two widely accepted graphical
tools used in the safety analysis of software. Because some software
is life and property critical, thorough analysis techniques are
essential. Independently, Petri nets and fault trees serve limited
evaluation purposes. This thesis presents a technique that converts
and links Petri nets to fault trees and fault trees to Petri nets. It
enjoys the combinational benefits of both analysis tools.
Software Fault Tree Analysis and timed Petri nets facilitate
software safety analysis in heterogeneous-multiprocessor control
systems. Analysts use a Petri net to graphically organize the selected
software. A fault tree supports a hazardous condition with
subsequent leaf node paths that lead to the hazard. Through the
combination of Petri nets and fault trees, an analyst can determine a
software fault if he can reach an undesired Petri net state,
comparable with the fault tree root fault, from an initial marking.
All transitions leading to the undesired state from the initial marking
must be enabled and the states must be marked that represent the
leaf nodes of the fault tree path.
It is not the intention of this thesis to suggest that an analyst be
replaced by an automated tool. There must be analyst interaction
focusing the analyst's insight and experience on the hazards of a
system. This method is proposed only as a tool for evaluation during
the overall safety analysis.
iv
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A. SAFETY-CRITICAL HETEROGENEOUS SYSTEMS
Many military systems require specialized multiprocessors.
Weapon systems and aircraft control systems are prime examples.
They have complex controlled system architectures that must
operate under tight timing constraints requiring the use of multiple
processors to execute independent control tasks. System developers
may include multiple processors in the initial prototype design or
add them during subsequent upgrades. The system may consist of
many identical processors, but specific control needs require
heterogeneous processors.
"Normally only software that exercises direct command and
control over the condition or state of the hardware components or
can monitor the state of the hardware components are considered
critical from a safety viewpoint." [Ref. 2] Software that controls and
monitors systems, such as missiles or aircraft, is safety-critical.
The use of software in safety-critical flight systems in
multiprocessing environments such as the A6, F18, and the proposed
P7 military aircraft leads to a need to analyze the safety of software.
These intricate multiple-mission systems are susceptible to four
different types of software faults. The first type is an undesired or
unexpected event. The second type is an event occurring out of
sequence. The third type is a specified event failing to occur. The
last type is the magnitude or the direction of an event is wrong.
[Ref. 2] The use of incompletely developed and analyzed software in
safety-critical systems may cause the loss of life, prcperty, or
environmental harm. Formal analysis methodologies executed at all
stages of development, from requirements analysis through
maintenance, help to reduce this loss.
For any given system task the flow of execution of the software
controlling that task may span several processors [Ref. 1]. Flight
systems execute many tasks simultaneously just to keep the craft
airborne and proceeding in a pilot- or automatically-controlled
direction.
B. RISKS OF ERRONEOUS SOFTWARE
Risk is the probability of an accident occurring of a specified
magnitude over a given time period. When the task, like flight
control, involves a risk of human life or property, the analyst
executes an evaluation of the safety of the software in order to avoid
an accident or mishap.
The term "mishap" denotes an unplanned event or series of
events that result in death, injury, occupational illness, damage to or
loss of equipment or property, or environmental. It includes both
accidents and harmful exposures. "A mishap can be thought of as a
set of events combining in random fashion or, alternatively, as a
dynamic mechanism that begins with the activation of a hazard and
flows through the system as a series of sequential and concurrent
events in a logical sequence until the system is out of control and a
loss is produced (the 'domino theory')." [Ref. 4]
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Safety is a concern when systems are controlling or releasing
energy. such as mechanical, electrical, or chemical. When software is
used in such systems, safety must be insured so the risk to human
life is minimum.
To ensure the safety of software is to prevent mishaps. Software
faults may lead to hazards, and hazards may lead to mishaps;
therefore, evaluation of safety-critical software events is vital.
Software alone is not hazardous, but when the software controls
a system, it becomes as potentially hazardous as the total system. A
failure, malfunction, or design error in the control of hardware
components causes or allows a hazard to occur.
A fault is a software bug. This may lead to an error, a
discrepancy between a computed, observed or measured value or
condition and the true specified, or theoretically correct value or
condition. An error, in turn, may lead to a failure: the termination of
the ability of a functional unit to perform its required function.
[Ref. 5]
Software faults may result from incorrect or incomplete
specifications and requirements, leading to incorrect or incomplete
designs, incorrect programming or coding, or hardware-induced
corruption. Hopefully, a thorough testing program would locate all
faults. In reality, however, the many possible combinations of
sequences makes total fault detection extremely difficult. Also,
analysts only write tests against requirements, so they ma) overlook
incorrect requirements.
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In the past, analysts did not find many latent software faults
until the prototype was out in the field. Safety-critical systems
cannot afford this delay in fault discovery because once the system is
out in the field, people, property, or the environment may be at risk.
The analyst must execute thorough analysis in the stages before
system delivery to help prevent risk.
A thorough safety analysis is possible because it does not need
to consider all faults, just safety-critical faults. Safety analysis only
evaluates the system for possible faults derived from the
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA).
C. EVALUATION OF SOFTWARE SAFETY
The evaluation of the software safety must trace the flow of
software execution, analyzing the sequential and concurrent
operations performed and determining if the system acts to prevent
or reduce risks. Currently, analysts execute manual analysis using
limited evaluation tools, with substantial cost and opportunity for
analysis errors. Inaccurate results occur readily in systems where
analysts base analysis and design on informal discussions between a
software expert group and a system applications expert group.
MWay analysts depend too much on "corporate knowledge" and not
enough on the use of proven methods of design, analysis, and
testing. Life-, property-, and environment-critical systems urgently
require thorough safety analysis in the software life cycle to avoid
risk to life and property.
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Leveson [Ref. 7] surveys software safety in terms of why, what,
and how. "A fair conclusion might be that 'why' is well understood,
'what' is still subject to debate, and 'how' is completely up in the air."
[Ref. 7]
Analysts may combine multiple analysis techniques to evaluate
safety. This thesis presents one integration method of "how"--the
combination of SFTA and Petri net analysis techniques--in this thesis.
D. SOFTWARE FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
Leveson and Harvey [Ref. 6] developed Software Fault Tree
Analysis (SFTA). Hardware system analysts use Fault Tree Analysis
(FTA) to analyze a system in the context of its environment and
operation. They find credible sequences of events that can lead to a
specified hazard. Leveson and Harvey derived SFTA from FTA to
analyze systems containing software components. The fault tree is a
graphic representation of parallel and sequential combinations of
events and system states that result in the occurrence of the
predefined hazard. The events and states can be associated with
component failures, human errors, or any other pertinent events and
states that can lead to the hazard. A fault tree represents the logical
interrelationships of events and states that lead to the hazard.
E. TIMED PETRI NETS
Murata [Ref. 8] and Leveson/Stolzy [Ref. 9] state that timed Petri
nets describe time-critical events in multiprocessor control
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applications and determine if safety-critical states are reachable
during normal execution.
The analyst models a system in terms of conditions and events
with Petri nets. "If certain conditions hold, then an event or 'state
transition' will take place resulting in other (or the same) conditions
taking place." [Ref. 2]
In the past, analysts mainly used Petri nets to evaluate
performance and correctness. Researchers are currently proposing
that analysts can achieve timing more readily with Petri nets than
with fault trees.
F. SFTA AND PETRI NET INTEGRATION/TRANSITION
SFTA and timed Petri nets are integrated in this thesis to
facilitate software safety analysis in heterogeneous-multiprocessor
control systems. These techniques are equivalent in expressive
power; analysts can facilitate both techniques by allowing one
technique to use the information about the system expressed by the
other technique. [Ref. 1]
Analysts use a Petri net to graphically organize the selected
software code. A fault tree explicitly supports a hazardous condition
root node with subsequent leaf node paths that lead to the hazard.
Through the combination of Petri nets and fault trees, an analyst can
determine a software fault if each preconditional node in an entire
fault tree path links to one or more Petri net transitions and states.
Drawing on the specific A-6E example developed in McGraw's
thesis [Ref. 10], Shimeall, McGraw, and Gill [Ref. 1], describe a general
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technique for integrating these two analysis techniques. It uses a
semantic model for information sharing between the techniques
during the analysis. This model consists of three classes of objects:
states, transitions, and linkages. The states contain information on
conditions existing during program execution. Transitions contain
information on actions performed during program execution, and
reference the states that lead to and result from the transitions.
Transitions also include timing information, indicating the enabling
and firing times of the actions, along with deadlines after which the
action stops. The state references in the transitions allow for any
combination of states. The linkages contain information on undesired
events. In general, the states and transitions contain information for
the generation of Petri nets, and the linkages contain additional
information for the generation of fault trees.
The semantic model forms the basis for automated support of
the safety analysis process by allowing the analyst to rapidly and
easily shift between techniques. The analyst may use Petri nets to
describe the system architecture, shift to fault trees to describe the
hazards associated with the system and the events that may lead to
the hazards, then shift back and forth between Petri nets and fault
trees to analyze those events. Each analysis technique may easily use
the results obtained by the other technique. [Ref. 1]
This thesis expands on the Shimeall, McGraw, and Gill work by
delineating a stepwise methodology for converting Petri nets to fault
trees and fault trees to Petri nets. Graphical, as well as tabular,
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linkages describe the Petri net/fault tree relationship and multi-step
conversions.
G. SCOPE OF THESIS
The main research and development for this thesis suggests a
methodology for integrating timed Petri net analysis and SFTA to
analyze software system safety. Chapter II provides an overview of
the background information researched and synthesized with
original thought to create the proposed integrated safety analysis
technique. Chapter III delineates a step-by-step Petri net to fault
tree and fault tree to Petri net conversion and linkage process.
Chapter IV discusses a summary of the research executed to develop
the proposed integrated technique, the technique itself, and an
analysis of its effectiveness as a safety-analysis technique. Chapter
IV also presents recommendations for further study in the field of
safety-analysis-technique integration.
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II. CURRENT PETRI NET AND FAULT TREE ANALYSIS
TECHNIQUES
This chapter surveys Petri net and fault tree research. Analysts
may use any of several analysis techniques for a safety evaluation of
a software system. However, the author selected Petri nets and fault
trees for the proposed integrated method of safety analysis because
first, they are the most mature, and.second, analysts have used them
in analysis for a relatively long time. Researchers have focused a
great deal on these two graphical representations. Also, the
individual qualities of Petri nets and fault trees interleave well into a
single, effective analysis technique.
This survey describes some possible application areas of Petri
nets and fault trees, giving both the strong and weak points of each
analysis technique and describing a detailed graphical and textual
representation of general Petri nets and fault trees.
A. PETRI NET APPLICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
Carl Petri [Ref. 11] created Petri nets in the 1960s. Researchers
have made many enhancements since then. Murata [Ref. 8] surveys
current Petri net properties and techniques thoroughly. "Petri nets
are a promising analysis tool for describing and studying information
processing systems characterized as being concurrent, asynchronous,
distributed, parallel, non-deterministic, and/or stochastic." [Ref 8]
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Petri nets are a graphical and mathematical tool that apply to
many software systems. Some possible areas of applications are
modeling and analysis of distributed-software systems, concurrent
and parallel programs, multiprocessor memory systems,
asynchronous circuits and structures, compiler and operating
systems, and other discrete-event systems. Additional interesting
applications are local-area networks, neural networks, and decision
models. [Ref. 8]
Analysts use Petri nets to graphically represent a system,
explicitly reflecting the concurrent or parallel activities of the
system.
A Petri net is graphically represented as a directed graph with
two kinds of nodes: places and transitions. It is textually
represented as a five-tuple. The set of places, textually represented
as P [Ref. 8] and drawn as circles, indicates the conditions or values
present during program execution. The set of transitions, textually
represented as T [Ref. 8] and drawn as bars or boxes, indicates the
events that occur during program execution. Arcs join the places and
the transitions as shown in Figure 2-1 [Ref. 10]. The arcs leading to a
transition represent a precondition or an input and the arcs leading
from a transition represent a postcondition or an output. These arcs
are textually represented as a flow relation, F [Ref. 8], with weight,
W, indicating what flows must be present for a transition to occur.
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A marking, the presence of tokens in a subset of the places in
the net, indicates the current state of the system. The M0 set in the
five-tuple [Ref. 81 represents the system initial state.
When a transition fires, indicating a change in the system state,
it consumes a token from each of the input arcs, and generates a
token on each of the output places. A transition leading from one set
of places to another is enabled to fire when all of the places leading
into the transition contain tokens [Ref. 10] (See Figure 2-2 [Ref. 8]).
Each transition potentially enables further transitions as shown in
Figure 2-3. If more than one transition is enabled at once, a non-
deterministic choice is made as to which transition fires [Ref. 1].
The importance of this non-deterministic firing representation is
that in real life, events do not purely happen sequentially. A
discrete event can occur at any time that all of its preconditions have
been met. One example is driving a car from point A to point B.
There are many mechanical and maneuvering events that can take
place between point A and point B. Some events have a particular
order. The driver must turn the ignition key before the engine
starts. Many events can happen concurrently. The driver may apply
pressure to the accelerator and turn the wheel at the same time. He
may execute many non-deterministic decisions while getting from
point A to point B and Petri nets can represent these decisions well.
Using timed Petri nets allows the incorporation of timing information




Figure 2-1 Basic Petri Net Structure
ti
tz




Figure 2-3 Basic Petri Net Structure With Tokens After
Transition
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timing analysis. Even basically correct software actions that occur
too early or too late can lead to unsafe conditions. [Ref. 9]
Analysts add a minimum time function and maximum time
function to the above five-tuple Petri net description to define the
time frame boundaries within which a firing can occur.
Safety analysis determines if the net can reach an unsafe state.
A human can make an unsafe decision outside of the system, such as
pulling out into ongoing traffic, but the hardware and software
system should not allow a hazard to be reachable.
In the safety analysis [Ref. 9], if an unsafe event (represented by
a transition) can be reached from the initial marking M0, corrections
need to be made. If it is possible that a marking will eventually
cause a transition to be enabled, the transition is reachable from the
marking. Analyzing a system can be complex, but the Petri net aids
in the visual understanding of event ordering and results.
Figure 2-4 [Ref. 12] contains Ada code for the control of a traffic
light. A Petri net can represent all system states and transitions
relating to the software algorithms. Figure 2-5 depicts the timed
Petri net associated with the Ada code in Figure 2-4.
Table 1 describes the transitions representing events that could
cause the hazard of both the East/West and the North/South cars
entering the intersection at the same time. These descriptions reflect
the erroneous activity of the East/West light while the North/South
car may enter the intersection.
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1 procedure traffic is
2 type direction is (east, west, south, north);
3 type color is (red, yellow, green);
4 type light.type is array (direction) of color;
5 lights : light-type :r (green, green, red, red);
6 task type sensor-task is
7 entry initialize (mydir : in direction);
8 entry car.comes;
9 end sensor-task; -
10 se sor : array (direction) of sensor-task;
11 task controller is
12 entry notify (dir : in direction);
13 end controller;
14 task body sensor.task is
15 dir : direction;
16 begin
17 accept initialize (mydir : in direction) do









27 task body controller is
28 begin
29 loop
30 accept notify (dir : in direction) do
31 case dir is
32 when east I west c
33 lights : (green, green, red, red); delay 5.0;
34 lights (yellow. yellow, red, red); delay 1.0;
35 lights : (reO, red, green, green);
36 when south I north =>
37 lights :z (red, red. green, green); delay 5.0;
38 lights : (red red. yellou., yellow); delay 1.0;


















Table 1 TRANSITIONS LEADING TO HAZARDS IN THE
TRAFFIC LIGHT CONTROLLER
ORIGINATION TRANSITION DESTINATION
P2 Car at E/W E/W car runs light P1 E/W car through
intersection
P3 E/W light yellow Light broken- P1 E/W car through
Stuck on yellow intersection
P4 E/W light green Light broken- P1 E/W car through
Stuck on green intersection
P5 E/W light red Light broken- E/W car runs light
Stuck on red
P4 E/W light green > 5 second delay P 3 E/W light yellow
from green to yellow
P3 E/W light yellow >1 second delay P 5 E/W light red
from yellow to red
P4 E/W light green >6 second delay P5 E/W light red
from green to red
P5 E/W light red Light prematurely P4 E/W light green
green
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If an analyst can follow a hazardous-condition path within the
software code during Petri net analysis, the system will have to be
modified. Software safety analysts only seek software controlled
errors.
Time is critical in this specific example. Software developers
determined the delay times for light changes by hard-coding these
changes in lines 32 through 39 of the selected Ada code. If a light is
functioning, but is delayed on green or yellow too long, or turns
green prematurely, a hazard exists and the software code needs to be
corrected.
Consider the last item in Table 1, the East/West light turning
prematurely green and allowing the two perpendicular cars in the
intersection at the same time. The initial markings for Figure 2-5
could be in first in P5, indicating the E/W light is red, second in pg,
indicating the North/South light is green, tnd third in Pt , indicating
a car is at the North/South intersection.
Because P4 can be reached prematurely while the North/South
light is going through its timing sequence, modifications must be
made to the software system. One possible scenario that exposes a
hazard is: 1) A North/South car approaches the intersection and its
signaling turns the North/South light green. 2) An East/West car
approaches the intersection, finds the East/West light red, signals for
green, and waits. 3) A second North/South car approazhes the
intersection, checks the light, and sees green. This North/South car
enters the intersection, but as it is entering, the East/West light turns
17
green. The undesired result is that one North/South car and one
East/West car are in the intersection at the same time.
The drawback in using Petri nets for analysis is that they are
difficult and time consuming to analyze. To generate the entire
reachability graph from Petri nets consumes exponential space and
time. [Ref. 10]. Integrating this analysis method with the more
specific fault tree approach to analysis may make evaluation simpler
and potentially save time and money while maintaining order,
concurrency, and timing.
B. FAULT TREE APPLICATIONS AND DEVELOPMENT
Researchers created Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) in the 1960s for
analyzing hardware. Electrical and/or mechanical systems needed a
way to analyze safety. Researchers then created Software Fault Tree
Analysis (SFTA) in the early 1980s to evaluate applications and
systems software. [Ref. 6]
The safety analyst conducts a Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHA) of the software first. PHA seeks to find potential hazards
involved in the execution of a system. The analyst then places these
hazards into severity categories He then employs SFTA to point out
single-point failure modes and guide further design in the most
fruitful direction for hazard elimination and reduction [Ref. 12].
Certification personnel may use SFTA to examine already-developed
software.
An undesired event, or hazard, could occur due to environmental
conditions, human error, or component failure. The fault tree depicts
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the logical interrelationship of these basic events that lead to the
hazard. SFTA works backward and tries to prove that the hazard
cannot be reached. [Ref. 6]
A fault tree developer takes the root node and abstractly
establishes sets of possible conditions, or leaf nodes, that lead to the
root node.
"Proof by contradiction is conveniently used in SFTA since the
goal of the analysis is to prove that the software will not permit
some event." [Ref. 12] If the analysis can prove a contradiction to the
loss (root) event then the event cannot happen as a single-point
failure within the software. If the initial software or system state
starts a possible series of events that lead to the root event, then the
system developers need to alter the software or system design to
prevent the root event [Ref. 1].
Leveson and Harvey [Ref. 61 list and describe the relevant fault
tree symbols used in SFTA. These graphical representations are
shown in Figure 2-6. Fault trees are textually represented by N, the
set of nodes, and G, the set of 'and' and 'or' gates.
One possible hazard description resulting from a PHA done on
the high-level Ada code in Figure 2-4 [Ref. 12] is that both a car from
the North/South direction and a car from the east/west direction can
enter the intersection at the same time. Figure 2-7 portrays
probable scenario nodes that could lead to this root node.
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The rectangle indicates an event to be analyzed furdier.
The circi indicates a basic fault event or primary
failure of a component. It requires no further
development, and its probability of occurrence is
derived from the generic rate of the part.
The house is used for events which normally occur in
tihe system. It represents the continued operation of the
component, and its probability is the reliability of the
part.
The diamond is used for non-primal events which are
not developed further for lack of information or
insufficient consequence.
The ov l is used to indicate a condition. It defines the
state of dhe systcm that permits a fault sequence to
occur. It may be normal or result from failures.
The AND gate serves to indicate that all input events
are required in order to cause the output event.
The OR gate indicates that one or more of the input
events are required to produce the gated events.
Figure 2-6 Fault Tree Symbols
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at the same time N/S Light Green
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Figure 2-7 Possible Fault Tree for Traffic Light Controller
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For fault tree development and evaluation for other hazards, the
analyst should expand on the remainder of the root nodes derived
from the PHA in order of priority.
A spurious yellow or green light being displayed in the
North/South direction while a green light is displayed in the
East/West direction are two conditions that would support the
possibility of two cars coming from perpendicular directions being in
the intersection at the same time.
Figure 2-8 [Ref. 121 expands on Figure 2-7 by detailing and
tailoring the fault tree to examine the traffic-light program for the
presence of spurious light conditions that enable two perpendicular
cars to be in an intersection at the same time. The selected Ada code
determines the timing of the light changes in lines 32 through 39.
System developers hard-coded delay times for light changing.
Because the high-level code allows at least one path from the
initial system state to the hazard, the Ada code supports the fault
tree and is hazardous.
"The above fault tree analysis demonstrates that the above Ada
code could contribute to the hazard (i.e., two cars, traveling at right
angles to one another, are present in the intersection at the same
time) if two successive rendezvous occur with the east or west sensor
tasks and the north sensor task checks the state of the lights
immediately prior to the second rendezvous". [Ref. II] Eliminating
this hazard requires changes to the code or controller.
22
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SFTAs are limited as the only tool used for analyzing the software
safety of a system. Fault trees are a static analysis technique.
Timing analysis requires dynamic analysis. [Ref. 7] "They can,
however, detect software logic errors and multiple failure sequences
that may have essential information that can be shared with Petri
net analysis". [Ref. 10]
C. INTEGRATING ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES
The software system safety research community has established
integrating multiple system reliability analysis techniques over the
past few years. Researchers developed one technique, the Hybrid
Automated Reliability Predictor (HARP) [Ref. 13] in 1986. It
integrates fault tree notation with the Markov Chain. "HARP
converts the dynamic fault tree model notation into a Markov Chain
and solves the Markov Chain using a standard well known numerical
integration algorithm." [Ref. 14]
For many applications, analysts may use either software fault
trees or timed Petri nets to evaluate safety critical behaviors of the
control software [Ref 1]. Petri nets explicitly model the structure of a
control system and the events during the execution of the control
system. The semantics of those events and the resulting conditions
are only represented abstractly. In fault trees, the semantics of the
conditions and events are explicitly described, but the structure that
gives rise to those events is dealt with abstractly [Ref. 1].
Shimeall, McGraw, and Gill [Ref. 1] argue for an integration of
these two analysis techniques that gives the analyst different views
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of the system. Analysts should not consider Petri nets and fault
trees to be alternate techniques, but complimentary to one another.
Leveson and Stolzy [Ref. 9] use Petri nets and FTA in conjunction
with one another. Developing a complete reachability graph from the
Petri nets representing a system is time consuming and difficult;
however, the evaluation is simpler when Petri nets only describe the
key portions of a system. [Ref. 9] The safety analyst only needs to
consider life-, property-, or environment-critical portions of the
high-level code in the analysis.
The SFTA system state information, represented as the
preconditional leaf nodes to a specific root fault discovered in the
PHA reduces the massive nature of Petri net analysis [Ref. 10]. Fault
trees address one specific undesired event at a time, breaking the
system analysis down into multiple discrete safety issues.
McGraw [Ref. 10] analyzes a real-time software example that is
the upgrade of the A-6E operational flight program (OFP 240). China
Lake controls and directs the new program, OFP 250. McGraw
represents a key portion of this system with a Petri net and a fault
tree.
Shimeall, McGraw, and Gill [Ref. 1] define the semantics of a
linkage relation for a Petri net and a fault tree. They construct the
semantic model shown in Table 2 by joining the separate formal
descriptions presented previously and adding the linkage relation.
This linkage represents the logical relationship between fault tree
nodes with Petri net places and transitions. Textually there are three
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Table 2 PETRI NET, FAULT TREE, AND SEMANTIC FORMAL
DESCRIPTIONS
Timed Petri Nets:
tpn= <P, T, F, W, E. DA I >P = (P,,P2,.--.,P,.) places
T {t, f2, ---, 4) transitions
F9 (P xT) U(T xP) flow relatio,
W: F " {1,23,...) weight (tokens on each. flow)
E = {e, e2', ... , el) cllillg tinles
D = {d,, d2,..., dk) deadline timres
Mo : P - {1,2,3,...) initLinl nrking
Fault Trees:fi = < N, G,S, C,R>
V = { 1, 1'2, ..., nj) nodes (fault/failure statements)
G = {q,,g2, ..... j g e'cs (logical connections)
S = {s $2, s ... ,s;} shaIpes (analysis role)
C C (N x N) dld relat, 01
1R E N root node
Semantic NMoclcl
sm = < L, fpvn, f >
L C (P U T) x G x X linkgc rdai.-ion
Constraints
PnT= 0. PuT -
V 1 5 i < k. e 0 DAd,> DAd, > ,i
Vi, 1 < i < j,.Y, E {anl,or. ,1,ll)
Vi, 1 5 i 5 j, 5, E {box, house. li moicil. circleoval)
Icl= j - I
Vi,1 < i <j.
(ni R = 1{(nl,,,7,) E Cs.. q 5 5 j A q # i)I= 1)A
(ni =R* ((n.,n,)E C.-.. 5l 15jAq i)l = O)
Vy, y E (P U T),Vn,n E A,
(3g, g E {and,or, nutl),( j, n) E L)*
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elements: 1) the union of Petri net P, places, and T, transitions, 2) G,
the linkage containing 'and' , 'or', or 'null' gates, and 3) the fault tree
N, nodes that define a Petri net fault tree linkage.
Chapter III expands on this work by describing the conversion
from a Petri net to a fault tree, the conversion from a fault tree to a
Petri net, and the formal linkage relationship between the two. Once
the analyst identifies the places and transitions that may lead to the
root event, he incorporates them into the linkage relation [Ref. 1].
Integrating, converting, and linking Petri net and fault tree
analysis techniques in order to evaluate selected software code may
reduce the development and maintenance efforts by reducing
redundant analysis.
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III. ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE INTEGRATION
A. INTRODUCTION
This thesis presents an analysis technique that integrates
software fault tree analysis (SFTA) and timed Petri nets to facilitate
software safety analysis in heterogeneous-multiprocessor control
systems. The combination of Petri nets and fault trees in software
safety analysis provides a greater convenience than using either
individually.
The purpose for integrating Petri nets and fault trees is to
enhance software safety analysis. The integrated technique melds
the use of the Petri net representation of system events and the
explicit fault representation and diagnosis in fault trees for a
synergistic effect.
The example analyzed here proves that the design of a change in
the flight control system of the A-6 fighter/bomber prevents an
important hazard, inadvertent missile launch during practice
[Ref. 10]. The Petri net in Figure 3-1 (taken from McGraw [Ref. 10])
represents a high level control flow of the proposed upgrade to the
Grumman A-6E Operational Flight Program (OFP 240).
The analyst must make a decision whether to begin the safety
analysis with Petri net or fault tree development. The analyst
creates the Petri net to organize and partially order the events that
occur during system execution. This visual representation of events,
via transitions and states, simplifies the the analyst's understanding
28
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of individual software algorithms and their interaction for those
system evaluators inexperienced or experienced with computer
programming. When analysts pictorially organize activity paths, it is
easier to point out system problems that may lead to hazards. This is
especially true when there is concurrency or timing of action.
Leveson and Stolzy [Ref. 9] explain Petri net development. A
conversion from a Petri net to a fault tree and a linkage between the
two is described in Section B. The analyst establishes a fault tree to
Petri net graphical and tabular linkage, as in Figure 3-2, while he is
creating the fault tree from a Petri net.
The analyst executes fault tree development first in the
proposed conversion and integration method if the system chosen for
analysis is independent, synchronous, localized, serial, deterministic,
or non-stochastic. The analyst tailors a fault tree to its top event that
corresponds to some particular system hazard, detailing the events
and conditions that lead to the hazard. [Ref. 1]
B. PETRI NET TO FAULT TREE CONVERSION AND
INTEGRATION
The dynamics of Petri nets aids the analyst in the understanding
and evaluation of complex systems. However, Petri nets only
abstractly represent the semantics of the events and conditions.
Should the analysis require explicit representation of the semantics,
the analyst may choose to convert the Petri net to a fault tree and to
pursue the analysis utilizing fault tree techniques. This section
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Figure 3-2 General Petri Net and Fault Tree Graphical and
Tabular Linkage
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1. Petri Net to Fault Tree Conversion Initiation
Initiate a conversion from a Petri net to a fault tree b y
choosing a root fault derived from the Preliminary Hazard Analysis
(PHA) of the high level code. The example root fault, nj (Practice
Command Causes Actual Effect), in Figure 3-3, is one of several root
faults that could result from a PHA on OFP 240.
Practice Command
II  Causes AcILalEffect
Figure 3-3 OFP Root Fault
2. Petri Net and Fault Tree Starting Point Link
The selected root fault provides a starting point for the link
between the Petri net and fault tree. Once the analyst has selected
the root fault, he associates it with the set of Petri net places and
transitions that may immediately lead to the root fault. For the OFP
240 example the fault tree root fault condition node, n1 (Practice
Command Causes Actual Effect) in Figure 3-2 corresponds to the
resultant transition, t16 (Command Executed), in Figure 3-1. The
effect being analyzed is the firing of the weapon prompted by the
executing command. While working backward in the Petri net, the
analyst develops and supports subsequent fault tree nodes by
working downward in the fault tree, as delineated in the next step.
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3. Petri Net to Fault Tree Graphical and Tabular Linkage
Link the fault tree to the Petri net by working backward in
the Petri net. This is done to see if the initial marking of the Petri
net is reached by linking new nodes in the fault tree to the Petri net
places and transitions they relate to. Figure 3-4 exemplifies a
graphical cross linking of a portion of the related existing Petri net
and newly created fault tree segments respectively. Note that the
fault tree node n2 (AIU Executes Live Command) also relates to the
Petri net transition t16 (Command Executed(STA)). This node and
transition both indicate the execution of the command to fire the
weapon. The later fault tree node n5 (Command Sent From ACU)
corresponds directly to the Petri net transition t14 (Pulse Propagated)
as the analyst works back up the Petri net. Two fault tree nodes, n9
(Command Enabled) and n1 0 (Arm Switch Signal On) are
preconditions to n5 . The fault tree node n9 links to the Petri net
transition t9 (Command Ready). The other node required before a
command is sent, n 0 (Arm Switch Signal On) , is analogous to the
P N I place P15- P15 indicates that a firing pulse is ready to for
propagation due to the prerequisite condition of the landing gear
being up.
This linkage can also be represented in tabular notation as
shown in Figure 3-5, reflecting the Petri net to the fault tree
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linked, each fault tree has one or more linked corresponding portions
of the Petri net identified in the Petri net fault tree (PNFT) Linkage.
4. Complete Development of the Petri Net Fault Tree
Linkage Table
Indicate the appropriate type of gate 'and', 'or', or 'null' in the
PNFT Linkage table. Use 'and' or 'or' when two or more Petri net
places and transitions relate to a single fault tree node and a null
when a single Petri net place or transition relates to a single fault
tree node. Figure 3-6 shows the gate relationships for the example
segment. Sometimes the table does not reflect a complete linkage.
Figure 3-7 represents the fully developed fault tree.
5. Remedy If No Path to the Unsafe Event is Exposed.
If it is not possible to work back to the beginning of the Petri
net, exposing a potential path to the unsafe event, do further analysis
and take at least one modification measure. Execute this
modification by expanding the fault tree, adding conditions, or
making an assumption and seeing where the assumption leads to in
the Petri net.
The software design itself may prevent a thorough backtrack,
reaching the root fault, from occurring even if there is a
single-component failure. This prevention may be determined by
comparing the conditions expressed in the fault tree with those
represented by the initial marking of the Petri net.
If it is necessary to extend the fault tree, integrate the nodes into an
expanded fault tree FTE. An existing fault tree leaf may become a
35
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Figure 3-6 OFP Basic PNFT Link Table With Gates
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FTE predecessor to the newly created nodes or a new expanded node
lineage stemming from the root node may develop as the analysis
proceeds.
The evolved FTE thus becomes the basis for a FTE to execute
Petri net PNE conversion. Execute the conversion from the FTE to a
PNE by linking the additional FTE nodes to their associated PNE places
and transitions.
If the Petri net has not changed except to reflect the FTE,
merely collate the links. Otherwise, establish the links to the new
places or transitions in the Petri net and collate the links.
Simultaneously create an expanded Petri net fault tree PNFTE
Linkage reflecting the relationships between the FTE and the PNE.
Determine their associated type of gates 'and', 'or', or 'null'. Execute
this cyclic conversion as many times as necessary during analysis.
C. FAULT TREE TO PETRI NET CONVERSION AND
INTEGRATION
Fault trees are are well suited to initially describe a system that
is ordered or deterministic. During the analysis, should concurrency
or timing issues arise, the analyst may elect to proceed using Petri
net techniques. This section details the steps involved in converting
fault trees to Petri nets.
Figure 3-8 shows the 'and' and 'or' relationships of transitions
and places in Petri net analysis.
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1. Fault Tree and Petri Net Starting Point Link
The root fault of the fault tree provides a starting point for
the development of a partial Petri net and link between the fault
tree and the Petri net. Figure 3-9 depicts the fault tree root fault
condition node, n1 (Practice Command Causes Actual Effect) as
creating P, of the Petri net. The hazard being analyzed is the firing
of a weapon during a simulated weapon use. While working top-
down in the fault tree develop subsequent transitions and places in
the Petri net, as delineated in the next step.
Event I
(a) AND Gate b RGt
Event 2 And
Figure 3-8 Petri Net 'and' and 'or' Gates
2. Fault Tree to Petri Net Graphical and
Tabular Linkage
Work downward in the fault tree to create the Petri net. For
each node in the tree, create a place in the Petri net to represent the
condition. Use transitions to represent the combinations indicated by
the gates in the fault tree. Create linkage elements with null gates to
represent the relationships. In Figure 3-9 the fault tree node n2
(AIU Executes Live Command) creates P2. This condition indicates
the execution of the command to fire the weapon. Fault tree node n5
39





Figure 3.9 Petri Net Creation from a Fault Tree
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(Command Sent From ACU) creates P3, the propagation of a pulse.
Two fault tree nodes, n9 (Command Enabled) and n 10 (Arm Switch
Signal On) are preconditions to n5 . Fault tree node n9  (Command
Enabled) creates P4 , command ready state. The other node required
before a command is sent, fault tree node ni 0 (Arm Switch Signal
On).creates P5. P5 indicates that a firing pulse is ready for
propagation due to the prerequisite of the landing gear being up.
Once the analyst creates a Petri net and links it to the fault
tree, the net must be augmented before any analysis may be
performed. The next step guides this augmentation.
3. Petri Net Completion
The initial Petri net generated from the fault tree will be
incomplete. Fault trees only contain events and conditions
specifically related to the root fault and omit all other functional
behavior. This omitted behavior must be added to the Petri net
before Petri net safety analysis can proceed.
Leveson and Stolzy [Ref. 9] describe how a Petri net may be
derived from a software system. In this case, the derivation is
focused on the gaps in the initial Petri net. As the Petri net is
completed, the analyst may need to combine and rearrange nodes
generated from the fault tree. As this is done, the linkage relation
must be modified to reflect the change. Further inspection of
analysis may reveal that the added portions of the Petri net relate to
portions of the fault tree. In that case, the analyst must include
41
these connections in the linkage relation, modifying 'null' gates to
'and' or 'or' gates as needed.
The derived and expanded Petri net may then be used for
safety analysis as described by Leveson and Stolzy [Ref. 9]. The
results of this analysis lead to the generation of new fault tree nodes
as described in Section B.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. INTEGRATED ANALYSIS TECHNIQUE
The work described in this thesis integrates Software Fault Tree
Analysis (SFTA) and timed Petri nets to facilitate software-safety
analysis in heterogeneous-multiprocessor control systems. The
integrated technique uses Petri nets for ordering events and
conditions across multiple processors, explicitly representing
concurrent and sequential events. This allows for simpler fault tree
analysis, or use of techniques such as those of Leveson and Stolzy
[Ref. 9], who describe Petri net analysis for concurrency errors and
time-related errors.
The recording of analysis logic, explicitly representing the
semantics of the events and conditions that lead to a hazard, requires
SFTA. Petri nets explicitly show combinations of events and
conditions but the semantics behind those events and conditions are
abstracted away. The integrated technique uses fault trees for
analyzing non-sequential (or non-local) sequences of conditions that
lead to a hazard, where several parts of the system must coordinate
for the hazard to occur. This part of the analysis is derived from that
of Leveson and Harvey.
A stepwise methodology is presented for converting a fault tree
into a Petri net or converting a Petri net into a fault tree, then linking
the two together for an integrated analysis. The order of technique
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usage is dependent on the particular software being analyzed.
During Petri net to fault tree conversion, the analyst establishes a
fault to a Petri net linkage while he is creating the fault tree from the
Petri net. Inversely, he establishes a Petri net to fault tree linkage
while he is creating the Petri net from the fault tree during fault tree
to Petri net conversion.
The resulting integrated linkage relation eases the iterative
conversion between the two analysis techniques. This relation links
information in one representation to fields of the other
representation.
B. LESSONS LEARNED
This thesis uses a formal basis to the integrated analysis
technique. This formal basis is useful as it clarifies information
content in the unions representations and provides a vocabulary to
discuss conversion and linkage. An initial, informal, conversion
sketch is created, then formalized and restructured around the
formalization.
Multiple views of analysis information are stressed. The
multiplicity of views gives the analyst a broader view of the analysis
process, allowing him to both detect more subtle problems in the
software and to identify problems in the analysis itself. The
multiplicity occurs across two dimensions: presentation of technique
(graphic and textual) and technique usage (Petri nets or fault trees).
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Graphic and textual views are essentially equivalent and
complimentary. The graphic view provides detail and connection
focus.
The integration of SFTA and Petri net analysis also gives the
analyst two complementary views of the system. The use of the
system's organizational representations in the Petri net and the
explicit fault representation and diagnosis in the fault tree are
melded for a synergistic effect. The Petri net provides organization
and emulation, whereas the fault tree provides combination and
logic.
C. FUTURE WORK
The first recommendation stemming from the work done in this
thesis is to automate the integrated software-safety analysis method
presented. An analyst shoul. not be replaced by an automated tool.
An analyst interaction focusing the analysts insight and experience
on the hazards of a 'ystem. This method is proposed only as a tool
for evaluation during the overall safety analysis. Tools exist for Petri
net (P-Nut) and fault tree (SFTAT) analysis. A means to tie these
tools together is suggested in this thesis.
Other modeling techniques that lend themselves well to
integration need to be explored (such as PHA, Markov Chains, and
FMEA). Individually, safety-analysis techniques have weaknesses
that may be better addressed by other techniques. The integration
of two or more analysis methods may well help to reduce life,
45
property, and environmental losses due to hazard-inducing software
by utilizing their combined advantages.
D. CONCLUSIONS
Software faults must not cause hazards after a system is in the
field. Loss of life or property can result from hazardous software
used in real-life environments. Analysts should make every effort to
find all safety-critical software faults before the developer delivers
the system to the users. Integrated analysis methods should
enhance early fault discovery by focusing on the key safety-critical
portions of the software and avoiding redundant analysis.
Further research in all areas of software-safety is required to
prevent hazards as early as possible in the development and
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